The High Court Report

M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of The IAM Pension Fund | Argument Date: 1/20/26 | Docket Link: Here
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (M&K Employee Solutions): Michael E. Kenneally, Jr., Washington, D.C.
For Respondent (IAM National Pension Fund): John E. Roberts, Providence, Rhode Island.
For United States as (Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent): Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Question Presented: Can pension plans charge higher prices using future prices, or must they stick with the original prices?
Overview: Four companies' pension withdrawal liability tripled from timing of actuarial assumption changes, creating circuit split over whether "as of" December 31st calculations require December 31st assumptions or permit retrospective professional judgment.
Posture: Arbitrators favored companies; D.C. District Court and Circuit reversed, permitting post-measurement assumption adoption with restrictions.
Main Arguments:
Petitioners: (1) "As of" language creates statutory deadline requiring pre-measurement assumption adoption; (2) Legislative framework expected annual assumption reviews before measurement dates; (3) Anti-manipulation principles from Section 1394 should apply to actuarial assumptions
Respondents: (1) "As of" establishes reference date, not completion deadline for retrospective valuations; (2) "Best estimate" requirement mandates current professional judgment over stale assumptions; (3) Standard actuarial practice permits and encourages post-measurement selection

Implications: Petitioner victory creates uniform nationwide timing deadlines for actuarial assumptions but potentially forces use of outdated professional judgments. Respondent victory maintains professional flexibility and accuracy in pension calculations but creates potential manipulation risks and planning uncertainty. Decision affects multiemployer pension withdrawals nationwide, involving billions in liability calculations. Ruling influences broader questions about statutory interpretation incorporating professional standards and temporal requirements in technical regulatory contexts.
The Fine Print:
29 U.S.C. § 1391: "The amount of an employer's withdrawal liability...shall be computed...as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs"
29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1): "actuarial assumptions and methods which...offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"

Primary Cases:
National Retirement Fund v. Metz Culinary Management (2020): Second Circuit held actuarial assumptions for withdrawal liability must exist by measurement date; automatic rollover applies absent timely changes
Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust (1993): Withdrawal liability creates "fixed and certain debt"; actuarial determinations receive presumption of correctness due to professional constraints and statutory requirements

Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview
[00:01:30] Oral Argument Begins
[00:01:41] M & K Opening Statement
[00:03:33] M & K Free for All Questions
[00:26:54] M & K Round Robin Questions
[00:31:47] IAM Opening Statement
[00:34:23] IAM Free for All Questions
[00:47:28] IAM Round Robin Questions
[00:47:31] United States Opening Statement
[00:48:39] United States Free for All Questions
[00:53:44] United States Round Robin Questions
[00:53:50] M & K Rebuttal

I'll create show notes and five alternative episode title options for this opinion episode.Now I'll create the show notes and title options for the M & K Employee Solutions opinion episode.
PART 1: SHOW NOTES
M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of IAM National Pension Fund | Case No. 23-1209 | Decided May 21, 2026 | Docket Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-1209.html
Overview: ERISA withdrawal liability dispute resolves when pension plan actuaries must select calculation assumptions, affecting billions in retirement obligations across multiemployer pension plans serving unionized workers nationwide.
Question Presented: Whether ERISA requires actuarial assumptions underlying withdrawal liability calculations get selected on or before the statutory measurement date.
Posture: D.C. Circuit affirmed district courts allowing post-measurement-date assumption selection, conflicting with Second Circuit precedent.
Main Arguments:
Employers (Petitioners): (1) Statute's "as of" language freezes all calculation inputs including assumptions on measurement date; (2) Actuarial assumptions constitute factual inputs requiring temporal fixation; (3) Broad anti-retroactivity principle prevents post-measurement assumption adoption.
Pension Fund (Respondent): (1) "As of" language sets reference point for hard data only while tools get selected later; (2) Actuarial assumptions constitute analytical methods not observable facts; (3) "Best estimate" requirement supports using most current available data when selecting assumptions.

Holding: The ERISA provisions governing the calculation of withdrawal liability from an underfunded Multiemployer Pension Plan do not require that actuarial assumptions underlying the calculation be selected on or before the statutory measurement date.
Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Affirmed D.C. Circuit.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning: (1) Section 1391's "as of" language assigns hard data to measurement date but permits calculation performance afterward using tools including assumptions; (2) Section 1393 imposes no deadline for assumption selection and Congress's omission from parallel provisions signals intentional choice; (3) "Best estimate" requirement necessitates access to most current data potentially unavailable before measurement date.
Implications: Pension plans gain flexibility to select actuarial assumptions after measurement dates using current market data and professional judgment. Employers lose timing-based challenges but retain substantive reasonableness challenges through arbitration. Actuaries avoid artificial deadlines while maintaining accountability through reasonableness requirements. Court leaves open whether assumptions must reflect only information available as of measurement date.
The Fine Print:
29 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)(E)(i): Withdrawal liability calculated based on plan's unfunded vested benefits "as of" the last day of plan year preceding employer's withdrawal
29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1): Actuaries must use "actuarial assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations) and which, in combination, offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"

Primary Cases:
Russello v. United States (1983): Where Congress includes particular language in one statutory section but omits it in another section of same Act, courts presume Congress acts intentionally and purposely in disparate inclusion or exclusion
Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc. (2020): Courts generally decline reading limitations into statutes that do not appear in their text

Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (M&K Employee Solutions): Michael E. Kenneally, Jr., Washington, D.C.
For Respondent (IAM National Pension Fund): John E. Roberts, Providence, Rhode Island.
For United States as (Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent): Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. | Oral Argument: 2/23/2026 | Case No. 24-983 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether Title III liability requires proving defendants trafficked in property plaintiff currently owns a claim to, or property plaintiff would own absent confiscation.
Overview: Cuban property confiscation case challenges Eleventh Circuit's "counterfactual analysis" requiring proof of hypothetical property ownership, potentially gutting Congress's primary tool for pressuring hostile regimes.
Posture: Eleventh Circuit reversed district court grant of summary judgment for petitioner.
Holding: Havana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines “trafficked” in Havana Dock’s property interest.
Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Sotomayor filed concurring opinion joined by Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning:
(1) Title III imposes liability for trafficking in physical property confiscated by Cuba, not just trafficking in plaintiff's property interest;
(2) "Using" confiscated property concerns physical things, not property interests—requiring one-to-one correspondence between interest confiscated and interest trafficked reads out obvious trafficking forms;
(3) Cuba confiscated both Havana Docks' concession and physical dock structures by seizing control, making docks tainted property off-limits to users.

Separate Opinions:
Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Kavanaugh): Flags infinite-recovery problem allowing unlimited repeated recoveries from unlimited defendants for single certified loss; raises due process concerns from government assurances cruises qualified as lawful travel.
Justice Kagan (dissenting): Majority misconstrues statute to allow recovery for trafficking in property plaintiff never owned; Cuba confiscated only time-limited concession, not physical docks Cuba always owned; temporal property boundaries deserve equal respect to spatial boundaries.

Implications: Companies doing business in Cuba using American-built infrastructure face substantial legal risk even when original American property interests expired decades ago. Decision preserves Title III as powerful deterrent preventing companies from waiting out clock on expired property interests. Lower courts must resolve whether statute allows unlimited repeated recoveries, whether lawful-travel exception shields defendants receiving government licenses, and whether concession limitations preclude passenger-service liability.
Main Arguments:
• Havana Docks (Petitioner): (1) Statute creates liability when plaintiff "owns the claim," not hypothetical property ownership; (2) Cuba confiscated physical dock facilities, not abstract concession rights; (3) Narrow interpretation defeats congressional deterrence objectives
• Cruise Lines (Respondent): (1) Property law requires respecting temporal limitations on original rights; (2) Concession excluded passenger services, preventing trafficking in cargo-only rights; (3) Congress balanced deterrence against property law principles
Implications: Havana Docks victory preserves congressional sanctions tool and reinforces meaningful private remedies against hostile regimes. Cruise lines victory creates roadmap for exploiting confiscated property through temporal limitations arguments, undermining deterrent effect and foreign policy objectives toward Cuba.
The Fine Print:
• 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person who traffics in property which the Cuban Government confiscated shall face liability to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"
• 22 U.S.C. §6023(12)(A): "Property" includes "any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest"
Primary Cases:
• Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935): Congress can restrict presidential removal power for independent agencies through "for cause" requirements, establishing legislative authority over agency independence
• United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (2007): Courts reject interpretations that "reduce potential plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering statutory provisions a dead letter"
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (Havana Docks Corp.): Richard Klingler of Ellis George LLP.
United States as Amicus Curiae: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.
For Respondents (Royal Caribbean Cruises): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy, PLLC.

Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview
[00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins
[00:01:12] Havana Docks Opening Statement
[00:03:15] Havana Docks Free for All Questions
[00:19:05] Havana Docks Round Robin Questions
[00:36:46] United States Opening Statement
[00:38:14] United States Free for All Questions
[00:47:30] United States Round Robin Questions
[00:57:21] Royal Caribbean Opening Statement
[00:59:35] Royal Caribbean Free for All Questions
[01:28:15] Royal Caribbean Round Robin Questions
[01:30:23] Havana Docks Rebuttal

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. | Case No. 24-983 } Oral Argument: 2/23/2026 | Decided May 21, 2026 | Docket Link: Here
Overview: Supreme Court preserves Title III liability for entities trafficking in physical property confiscated by Cuban Government even when plaintiff's underlying time-limited property interest expired before trafficking occurred.
Question Presented: Whether cruise lines using Havana docks face liability when plaintiff's concession expired before their alleged trafficking.
Posture: District Court granted summary judgment for Havana Docks; Eleventh Circuit reversed applying counterfactual analysis.
Main Arguments:
Havana Docks (Petitioner):
(1) Statute's "owns the claim" language focuses on current claim ownership, not hypothetical property ownership in alternate timelines;
(2) Cuba confiscated physical dock structures Havana Docks built, not just abstract concession rights;
(3) Congressional purpose requires deterring companies from profiting off stolen property regardless of temporal limitations.
Cruise Lines (Respondents):
(1) Property law fundamentals require respecting original temporal limits on property rights;
(2) Havana Docks' concession excluded passenger services and only covered cargo operations;
(3) Congress deliberately balanced deterrence against property law principles without providing universal relief.

Holding: Havana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines “trafficked” in Havana Dock’s property interest.
Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Sotomayor filed concurring opinion joined by Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning:
(1) Title III imposes liability for trafficking in physical property confiscated by Cuba, not just trafficking in plaintiff's property interest;
(2) "Using" confiscated property concerns physical things, not property interests—requiring one-to-one correspondence between interest confiscated and interest trafficked reads out obvious trafficking forms;
(3) Cuba confiscated both Havana Docks' concession and physical dock structures by seizing control, making docks tainted property off-limits to users.

Separate Opinions:
Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Kavanaugh): Flags infinite-recovery problem allowing unlimited repeated recoveries from unlimited defendants for single certified loss; raises due process concerns from government assurances cruises qualified as lawful travel.
Justice Kagan (dissenting): Majority misconstrues statute to allow recovery for trafficking in property plaintiff never owned; Cuba confiscated only time-limited concession, not physical docks Cuba always owned; temporal property boundaries deserve equal respect to spatial boundaries.

Implications: Companies doing business in Cuba using American-built infrastructure face substantial legal risk even when original American property interests expired decades ago. Decision preserves Title III as powerful deterrent preventing companies from waiting out clock on expired property interests. Lower courts must resolve whether statute allows unlimited repeated recoveries, whether lawful-travel exception shields defendants receiving government licenses, and whether concession limitations preclude passenger-service liability.
The Fine Print:
22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person that traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"
22 U.S.C. § 6023(4)(A): "The term 'confiscated' refers to the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the Cuban Government of ownership or control of property"

Primary Cases:
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1964): Cuban Government nationalized by forced expropriation property in which American nationals held interests; confiscation can affect both physical property and property interests
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002): Property interests defined by both geographic dimensions and temporal aspects; both dimensions must be considered when viewing interest in entirety

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | Case No. 25-83 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/30/26
Overview: A former hotel security guard lost his arbitration entirely, then argued the federal court he originally chose lacked power to confirm the award — forcing the Court to resolve when federal courts retain post-arbitration jurisdiction.
Question Presented: When a federal court pauses a lawsuit for arbitration, does it keep the power to confirm or throw out the arbitration result — even without independent jurisdictional grounds.
Posture: S.D.N.Y. confirmed award; Second Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert on the jurisdictional question.
Main Arguments:
Jules (Petitioner): (1) FAA Section 8 expressly grants "retain jurisdiction" language for maritime cases only — Congress deliberately omitted it from Sections 9 and 10; (2) Badgerow v. Walters (2022) forecloses jurisdiction because the confirm-or-vacate application lacks any independent federal basis on its face; (3) the jurisdictional-anchor theory incentivizes pointless federal lawsuits, directly undermining the FAA's purpose of keeping arbitrable disputes out of court
Balazs Respondents: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1367's supplemental jurisdiction statute — enacted separately from the FAA — grants courts power over all related claims in the same pending case, no new jurisdictional basis needed; (2) Badgerow addressed only freestanding new post-arbitration lawsuits, not pending federal cases already vested with original jurisdiction; (3) Jules's theory forces two simultaneous court tracks — federal appeal of the pre-arbitration order plus state-court post-arbitration proceedings — creating procedural chaos Congress never endorsed

Implications: A Jules victory forces winning arbitration parties to re-file in state court, pay new fees, re-serve defendants, and educate a new court from scratch — benefiting recalcitrant defendants. A respondents' victory preserves the rule in seven circuits: one court, one proceeding, one appeal resolves the entire dispute, giving businesses and employees certainty about where arbitration enforcement lands.
The Fine Print:
FAA Section 8, 9 U.S.C. § 8: "the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award"
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a): "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III"

Primary Cases:
Badgerow v. Walters (2022): Federal courts cannot use a "look-through" method to establish jurisdiction over FAA Section 9 and 10 applications — the application itself must reveal an independent jurisdictional basis
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co. (2000): The court with power to stay an action under FAA Section 3 holds the further power to confirm any ensuing arbitration award

Oral Advocates:
Jules (Petitioner): Adam G. Unikowsky of Jenner and Block.
Andre Balazs (Respondents): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone, LLP

Timestamps:
[00:01:25] Argument Begins
[00:01:32] Jules Opening Statement
[00:03:03] Jules Free for All Questions
[00:26:40] Jules Round Robin Questions
[00:32:42] Balazs Opening Statement
[00:34:05] Balazs Free for All Questions
[00:51:56] Balazs Round Robin Questions
[00:52:08] Jules Rebuttal