Paul Krugman Podcast

Thank you Eva Norlyk Smith, Ph.D., Leo Marcel Schuman, Caro Henry, Chitra 🦋 Eder, Deeanna Burleson, PhD, and many others for tuning into my live video with Heather Cox Richardson! Join me for my next live video in the app.
The conversation begins at minute 34.


Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe

Transcript
Jensen Huang is a fool who should never again be allowed close to anything involving national security. But the Nvidia honeypot story is about much more than one man. Because the way the Trump administration handled it — basically, its attempt to bury any inquiry into the clear threat Huang’s affair posed to U.S. interests — is part of a bigger story of betrayal at the highest levels.
Hi, Paul Krugman here.
Two years of Trump have led to a catastrophic decline in America’s global role.
Around the world, America is neither loved nor feared. The world has learned that we cannot be trusted to honor our promises or defend our allies; at the same time, we seem unable to punish our enemies. We have essentially lost a military war with Iran and a trade war with China; we may well be losing a technology race with China too.
How did we fall so far, so fast? It’s all about Trump. But I think it’s useful to ask why Trump has done so much to make America weak again.
Part of the answer is the sheer incompetence of the people Trump and his underlings have hired. To take the most spectacular example, we have a self-styled Secretary of War who believes that what our military needs in an age of drones and AI is testosterone shots. You couldn’t make this up.
And the incompetence isn’t an accident. MAGA hates people with expertise, because such people might engage in critical thinking and might care about their reputations. Only the truly hapless can be counted on to be truly loyal.
But it’s not just incompetence. There’s a clear element of betrayal — of key figures in or close to the Trump administration knowingly acting in ways that obviously make America less secure. I don’t know how much of this betrayal meets the legal standard of treason, but morally that’s what it amounts to.
Why do men (and sometimes women) betray their nation? I took the title of this post from a famous 1979 British book, “The Climate of Treason,” about the circle of elite Cambridge graduates who became agents of the Soviet Union. These traitors acted out of ideological conviction: They convinced themselves that Stalinism was the future, and acted on its behalf.
By contrast, the great American spy scandals — Aldrich Ames. Robert Hanssen, and so on — were mainly about corruption: they sold U.S. secrets for personal gain.
The Trump clique’s betrayals, I’d argue, have reflected a combination of these motives.
MAGA’s increasingly explicit support for Russia’s attempt to conquer Ukraine — that is, support for an anti-Western dictator against a pro-Western democracy — is, I believe, largely about ideology. It’s true that Trump and some of those around him may hope for lucrative business deals once Russia wins, and Trump has benefited financially in the past from his Russia connection.
But at base, I believe that Trump, Elon Musk, and many others on the hard right look at Putinism — authoritarian rule under which critics have a tendency to fall out of high windows, male supremacy, social illiberalism, crony capitalism for oligarchs with the right connections — and see it as an exemplar of what they want from a society. The financial payoffs are probably secondary.
By contrast, I don’t believe that there’s a faction within MAGA that sees Xi’s China as a role model, other than the authoritarian bit. The attempt to cover for Huang, the seemingly inexplicable decision to allow significant sales of highly advanced chips — one of America’s few clear advantages in the technology race — to China or buyers close to the Chinese government — are clearly motivated by money, money flowing to Trump and his pet projects. Nvidia itself, for example, gave $25 million to the Trump ballroom. The AI industry as a whole appears to have funneled hundreds of millions in Trump’s direction — and by all accounts people around Trump were covering for Huang in part because they feared that revealing the scandal would hurt an industry that has become a major source of financial support.
And does anyone really doubt that there are many other stories like this? Most obviously, Jared Kushner is being paid huge sums by Middle Eastern potentates. This is a huge scandal even if there weren’t any quid pro quos. And I’ll bet that we’ll eventually learn that there were, in fact, favors exchanged for that money.
The important thing is to realize that the people running this country, while they love to wave the flag — Hegseth is now claiming that to criticize him is to attack the troops — are utterly unpatriotic. They are completely unwilling to make personal sacrifices, no matter how small, or to pass up personal opportunities, for the sake of the nation. And of course at a fundamental level they hate everything this nation stands for, beginning with democracy and the rule of law.
In other words: USA! USA! USA!


Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe

. . .
TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Azeem Azhar
(recorded 10/29/26)
Paul Krugman: Hi everyone. I am talking today with Azeem Azhar, writer, researcher, investor with Exponential View, who is one of the people I turn to when I don’t understand what’s happening with AI, which is basically all the time. There was a really striking piece that Azeem wrote the other day about the PHP hack with the title, “The Wuhan Moment.”
Why don’t you explain to me what you mean by that, and let’s try to understand what’s going on here.
Azhar: Yeah. Well, that PHP hack was just one particular instance of a range of things that are now happening because AI models have become good enough. And the reason I called it the Wuhan moment is that there are infectious diseases all the time, but then came along one with slightly different characteristics, and it had a much bigger impact than all the other ones that were circulating.
So, when I say AI models have gotten more capable—we’ve had this experience as we use ChatGPT, it gets smarter and smarter—and AI models became good enough to be used in code, to be directed to find vulnerabilities and weaknesses and bugs in software. And because AI systems are tireless and indefatigable, and you can just spin more of them up and they don’t get exhausted, they’re not like human security researchers or human hackers. They can find all of these vulnerabilities, many vulnerabilities, quickly. They can research them in novel, non-human ways and chain them all together. And that’s a new regime that we find ourselves in. And it feels different to where we were a year or two ago when these weaknesses and vulnerabilities were discovered methodically by the occasional hacker, but generally by security teams. So that’s the moment.
Krugman: So my understanding is that basically the way the world works now is that there’s software everywhere. Everything is being run on software which is complicated and maybe not that carefully put together. Tell me if I’m wrong on this, but I think it’s sort of on stilts where you have newer software laid on top of older software, and God knows where the vulnerabilities are.
Azhar: Well, software and technology is this really big industry that somehow managed for 50 or 60 years to escape any part of safety testing.
Krugman: Right.
Azhar: And so, you know, that’s why you have beta releases and bug fixes, because the culture of software development for the longest period of time has been started from a tinkering mindset. And there’s no real security model required around software. It’s not an AI problem, it’s not a social media or an internet problem.
It was a problem in the ‘70s and the ‘80s. It’s just that we started to move from centralized mainframes to having personal computers and many, many more opportunities for that software to be developed in a decentralized way. And so here we are decades later, and it’s a miracle the internet works, given how many bugs and issues there are. But that has also been its benefit, because what it has by not being a fixed cathedral is agility. One software developer likened it to a crowded, buzzing bazaar. It has the ability to respond, adapt, and stay pretty resilient, which the internet has by and large done, except for a few major cyber attacks over the last 25 years. So what was a feature, and a flaw recognized by software engineers, that there’s no agreed security model for making software—has also been the reason why we’ve had a flourishing of software, and we are able to continue on our way even when bugs are found and there are problems that get discovered.
Krugman: Right. And a lot of it is based on PHP. You should probably tell people what it is. I mean, I actually had never heard of it until last week, but of course...
Azhar: Well, you’ve certainly used it. In reality, 70% of websites are running on PHP. It’s a programming language that happens to be very easy for people to use, and so it was cheap. If in the late ‘90s you wanted to write a piece of software, you used PHP. It’s simplistic; it doesn’t have the learning curve of C++ or something else. And it got extended and extended. Facebook used it a lot, and so it became part of the internet’s architecture. And like many other systems we use, like Python, which is another language, or BIND, which is a piece of software that turns friendly internet addresses like Substack.com to the numbers that the routers need. These are pieces of software that are actually open source as well, you know, they’re written by collaborations of volunteers who have their own governance systems, who share that code in repositories. And again, if you don’t think about it, you’ll be surprised. And it feels like it’s a miracle that it works, but we have evidence and proof that it does.
Krugman: Okay, and how relevant is it that it’s old? That PHP is a ‘90s thing. It’s all jerry-built, which was good enough until now we have these AI models that are tireless, right? And basically an army of gimlet-eyed experts in deception can go and find the holes, right?
Azhar: Right, yeah. I mean, the whole setup was maybe not quite on stilts because it all worked. It also has to be recognized that it’s really hard to write extremely precise, foolproof software in an enterprise—be it a corporate, consumer, customer environment—because standards change. If you want to understand why, think about the experience when you’re flying on an old plane, as you will across the Atlantic, and you pull up the in-flight entertainment, and the software is so slow compared to your modern smartphone because it had to be designed and locked down 18 years ago, or 10 years before the airline bought it, and it’s still in place. So all of these things were really part of the trade-off that we as customers and consumers made to have something that would adapt and be responsive to our lives. None of us really want to use the type of software that runs a nuclear power station, right? Because it’s stuck in the ‘70s or ‘80s. And that means that there are just lots of different ways of getting these pieces of code to crash, and once they crash, maybe to get access to the machine and figure out where to go next. And that’s what great hackers do.
AI models crossed a threshold at the start of this year when Anthropic had a model called Claude Mythos. It’s the best cybersecurity model in the world. It was not made widely available. In fact, only a small number of organizations get access to it. And they’ve been running around trying to patch or fix these bugs and close loopholes. The first part is finding them. But one of the things that happens with AI, is that the capabilities cascade down to cheaper models very, very quickly.
And so at some point this summer, the open-weight models, also known as open-source models, started to get towards the capabilities that Mythos had. And so they, too, crossed that uncanny valley into a point where they can be chained together and directed by either hackers or bad actors to find vulnerabilities before the good guys find them and then try to exploit them. And we’ve seen an uptick, a rapid increase in the number of those vulnerabilities that are being discovered. And this PHP one was one example of it.
And I guess what I was writing in my essay was to say, Look, what we know about these technologies is that they get cheaper, and as they get cheaper, they get used far, far more, right? We all take many more digital photos than we do film photos now from 40 years ago. The same thing would likely happen here. And that means if there are vulnerabilities or exploits, however obscure, it’s quite possible that they would be found and exploited. And I’ll just mention one data point that I’ve seen. There was one particular piece of software that had been tested for vulnerabilities trillions of times by humans running test suites. And yet a recent AI model was able, despite that, to find severe vulnerabilities that c…


Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe

Billionaires should not be making decisions critical to national security. That’s straightforward. And the case of Elon Musk and his attempt to undermine Ukraine makes that clearer than ever. Recent events, that is in the past 24 hours, really don’t change that point. If anything, they reinforce it.
Hi, Paul Krugman.
Yesterday, I wrote that Starlink’s control must be taken away from Elon Musk. The occasion was that Musk abruptly and without warning downgraded the effectiveness of Starshield, which is a sort of high velocity, high frequency version of Starlink that has been playing an essential role in Ukraine’s defense.
Suddenly, the speeds of communication were capped, which is devastating for Ukraine. Exactly how that happened? The Wall Street Journal reported that Musk made the decision or gave the order. Musk said that, oh, that’s under the White House’s control. The White House said, no, it was just him.
In fact, none of the parties to all of this are credible. None of them are reliable narrators. And it doesn’t really matter. The point is that this is a gray zone situation. That should not exist, that it should be very clear that if national security is at stake, which it is — this is a war in which US technology is playing a critical role — that unambiguously, this should be under the control of publicly elected officials, the president and Congress, not some guy who happens to have a lot of money. But it is not.
We have private property, but we are a democracy. And critical decisions for the national interest should be made by democratically elected leaders.
OK. So the development since then is that,according to both the Journal and the Times, Trump called Musk and asked him to lift the restriction on transmission speeds.
It’s completely unclear right now whether that has actually happened or to what extent it’s happened. Some reports say that speeds are up. Others say that nothing has changed. Obviously, this matters critically for how many Ukrainians will die this winter. But think about this at a fundamental level. The president asked a private business to stop killing Ukrainians.
This is not the kind of thing where you ask. Especially Donald Trump, who is very fond of giving orders in places where he has no authority. In this case, the idea that he’s saying, pretty please, Elon, don’t let quite so many Ukrainians die — this is not how things should be working.
This guy, meaning Elon Musk, should not be in this position. Beyond that, what we’ve actually seen is the fact that Trump asked, has certainly made a point of having people leak the fact that he had asked, although he himself has been a little bit blurry on exactly what happened,
This is actually telling you that having national security interests explicitly under control of elected politicians is a good thing even if the politicians have bad intentions. There’s no real question that whatever the details of how it happened that Starlink denied high-speed access to Ukraine, obviously it’s what Musk wanted, but also that at the very least Donald Trump was okay with it and it may have been what he wanted as well.
But Trump and Trump’s officials were hiding behind Elon Musk, were saying, well, this was Musk’s decision and, well, it’s a business and we don’t know what happened.
Again, nobody involved in this should be believed, should be trusted. And for the exact truth, I’ll wait for years of investigative digging to find out what happened, plus subpoenas. Because if Democrats do take Congress, especially if they take the Senate, they will be investigating with support from at least some Republican senators. Patriotism is not completely dead on the GOP side.
The important point here is that the public outcry, the outrage, the many articles written similar in some respect to mine, — though I think I was more explicit than most in saying essentially that we need to nationalize or at least take control of Starlink — but the public outrage mattered.
Even though Donald Trump clearly wants Vladimir Putin to win, he doesn’t feel that he can act too openly He can’t take a pro-Russian stance. He can’t be seen to be openly and explicitly undercutting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, which is, and was trying to avoid that.
Whether he gave the order or Musk gave the order doesn’t really matter. The fact was that the private ownership, private control of Starlink allowed Trump to hide behind, or he thought it would allow him to hide behind, the fact that this was a private enterprise. For the U.S. government to have ordered a U.S. government agency —say if Starlink was run by the Defense Department —for the U.S. government to order the Defense Department to cut Ukraine off at the knees was too much even for Trump.
And once it became clear that the attempt to pretend that this was not in accord with Trump administration intentions, whoever actually pulled the switch, was too much. And so now Trump is very visibly asking, pretty please, asking Elon Musk to let Ukraine defend itself.
That’s telling you that even with a bad president, explicit public control of national security does help. It means that public outrage gets reflected in policies that are somewhat less treasonous than would otherwise be taking place.
But this, of course, is just the beginning. Hopefully, in a little over two years, we will have a president who actually does support US interests and doesn’t work for Vladimir Putin. Before that, we will have a lot more, almost surely, a lot more congressional oversight. So this is a situation in which public policy will be infinitely better if it’s explicitly public policy than hiding behind the skirts of a multi-billionaire who owns these critical national assets.
Again, we don’t know what’s really happening. We don’t know whether the intention is to kind of muddy the waters and then to allow Musk to continue to undermine Ukraine. There’s just so much we don’t know. But we do know that the situation is unacceptable. It’s unconscionable.
National security is a matter for national policy. We know that whether Musk really acted independently — or whether the pretense that he was acting independently allowed Trump to do what he’s doing — policy is really bad when you leave critical national security interests in the hands of individual plutocrats.
So we did learn that public outcry appears to matter. It’s not that these guys are going to do whatever they’re going to do regardless. So by all means,keep up the pressure now, but the solution in the end has to be this cannot be an independent private enterprise. Maybe it can be run by somebody under contract, but the decisions about how Starlink is used — or many other technologies — the decision about how these are used to represent U.S. interests has to be a public decision. No more foreign policy, national security policy by billionaires.


Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe

. . .
TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with David Nir and G. Elliott Morris
(recorded 10/1/26)
Paul Krugman: Like almost everybody I know, I spend about 17 hours a day thinking about the midterms, and I’ve got G. Elliott Morris and David Nir from Strength in Numbers and The Downballot here to talk to me about: What do we know? What’s going to happen? What are the indicators? And then maybe some broader issues about what the heck we think is going on in U.S. politics. So, hi, guys. Welcome.
Elliott Morris: Hey, thanks, Paul.
David Nir: Paul, it’s a pleasure.
Krugman: So, yeah, as we record this, I guess it’s one month and two days before the midterms, and if I believe you guys, the polling and other indicators, which David will talk about, seem to be almost kind of shocking right now. Elliott, I just looked at your Fifty Plus One post, and I believe you now have 99% odds of Democrats controlling the House.
Morris: Yeah, well, it’s October, Paul. So we’re in what I consider spooky probability territory. 99% is when you start to go, “I hope these models are parameterized correctly.” Look, the way to unpack this: Our model at 50 Plus One shows a 99% chance that the Democrats will win 218 seats or more. 99% seems very large. As the forecaster, I don’t want to be wrong on the 99, but it makes sense when you look at the numbers on paper.
So, let’s take 2018 as a comparison case. That’s when Democrats won 235 seats in the House. That year, the generic ballot—which is a question that asks people how they will vote in their local congressional district, for which party they will vote—that has Democrats up somewhere between 8 and 9 points. Democrats won in 2018, leading the polls by about 8 or 9 points. They actually won the House popular vote by seven and a half points or so, if you account for some weirdness with, like, uncontested seats. So we are in a more favorable environment, if the polls are right, than 2018. And we also have a lot of other district-level indicators pointing the same way.
Krugman: But, I mean, the gerrymandering was fairly extreme before this, and if we go back to the beginning of this year, it was looking a little iffy, if I recall.
Morris: Yeah. So gerrymandering seems to have shifted maybe a handful of seats at most to the Republicans, accounting for some pretty rosy polling, for example, in South Texas and in Florida for the Democrats, where there’s been a larger shift than the national shift, which is about 10 or 11 percentage points. So if we are around eight points, our model says Democrats need to win the House popular vote by about three and a half points. So there’s room for the polls to be wrong by about five.
The average expected error for the polls at this point, 30 days before the election, is about three and a half percentage points. So we’re looking at a larger-than-average error in the polls. And then if you account for other indicators, district-level surveys, the race raters like we do, that’s how we get up to that 99. But yeah, I acknowledge this is a very, very large probability.
Nir: And Paul, just to address your point about the gerrymandering, which did heavily favor the GOP, it’s important to remember that Republicans were not doing that from a position of strength. They were doing it from a position of weakness, precisely because they knew that they were facing a very difficult midterm election. And they definitely—I can say this with certainty—definitely will not pick up, they will not flip, all of the seats that they targeted in Texas and Florida and elsewhere. And that has a lot to do with the quality of candidate recruitment on both sides.
And also, in particular in Texas and Florida as well, has a lot to do with Latino voters moving back against Trump after moving heavily for him in 2024. So, 2024 in a lot of ways was a high watermark. And so when you’re looking at how Trump performed in these districts two years ago, in a lot of cases, expect really a lot of fallback for the GOP.
Krugman: Tell me if I’m being underinformed here, but my understanding is that the gerrymandering was based, at least partially, on the assumption that the Hispanic shift towards Trump that took place in ‘24 was an enduring feature of the landscape, and that it all kind of goes wrong if, as now appears to be the case, it’s not enduring. Right?
Nir: That’s definitely what it appears to be. Because if you look at these redrawn districts, and instead of looking at how they went in 2024, if you go back a few years earlier and look at how they performed in 2020, when Joe Biden did much better with Latino voters than Kamala Harris did in many parts of the country, they show a much more competitive picture. And so you have Republicans talking about, you know, “Oh, these districts are Trump plus five, Trump plus ten, Trump plus 15.” But that’s 2024. You dial back to 2020, and suddenly we’re talking about districts that Joe Biden won, that Democrats have a real chance of holding on to in 2026.
Krugman: Okay. And I want to talk about other indicators, and polling in general. But just a question about the Senate: So now, we’re up into the 70s again for the Senate, right? And that’s a lot less. I mean, the Senate is sort of inherently gerrymandered. States that have about the population of some neighborhoods in the Bronx have as many seats as California. So, yeah. But that’s also looking pretty strong, right?
Morris: Well, speaking of state gerrymandering, don’t get me started about the drawing of the state border of Nevada. I mean, that was a gerrymander, right? So, look, the Democrats have 47 seats right now. They need 51 to have a majority and to overcome JD Vance’s tiebreaker as president of the Senate. So they need four pickups. They look likely, according to our model, to get a pickup in North Carolina, where the former governor, Roy Cooper, is running against the current chair of the Republican National Committee. So that’s what’s on my mind.
They look then likely as well to somewhere between a sort of toss-up and a lean Democratic seat in Texas and Ohio, where Democrats have got some good recruits in James Talarico and Sherrod Brown, a former incumbent senator of Ohio. And I should say Democrats are also very likely to hold on to their seat in Georgia, just for what it’s worth. And then we get into the seats that are, like, a lot, a lot tighter. That’s Iowa, currently Republican-held, but where the Democrat, Josh Turek, is leading the polls; Maine, where the polls were somewhat, you know, incredibly wrong in 2020, showing Susan Collins losing to—
Nir: Sarah Gideon.
Morris: See, this is why we do it together, Paul, right?
Krugman: Yeah, I know, it’s okay.
Morris: And then there’s Michigan, which seems like it should be a Democratic win in an environment where Democrats are ahead by eight points on the generic ballot. But the race is surprisingly close between Abdul El-Sayed and Mike Rogers. And there’s like a bunch of other reach seats that might be competitive. We can talk about Kansas, where Democrats currently have a polling deficit of under half a point in Kansas. Like, what’s the matter with Kansas?
Krugman: Yeah. I mean, objectively, Trump policies, especially a war that’s driven up diesel prices and fertilizer prices and all of that, has been really pretty bad for farm country. But I don’t know to what extent we’re seeing that, to what extent we’re just seeing really just bad Republican recruitment or just general Trump fatigue.
Morris: I’ll say one thing about the numbers and then hand it over to David. But the other Plains states—Nebraska, Iowa, and Kansas are the ones I’m thinking of—are all much more competitive than you would expect, given the fact that Donald Trump won these places by, you know, between 10 and 28 percentage points. I think in the case of Nebraska, if I’m remembering correctly. These are all within a point or so in the polls today, and back in 2025, w…


Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe